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BLYSTONE v. BLYSTONE.
A judgment fraudulently confessed by a debtor to defraud his creditors is valid
between the parties, and execution thereon will be enforced.
Though the parties to the judgment are in pari delicto, yet the judgment operates
as an execution and merger of the fraudulent contract. Per Tilorsosi, J.

ERnOR to Common Pleas of Crawford county.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
THOMPSON, J.-There is not much room for dispute about the
legal principles governing in cases of confederated fraud as
between the parties to it. The supposed difficulty lies in their
applicability to the case in hand. "There is a class of cases,"
said my brother WOODWARD, in Miller's Appeal, 6 Casey 478,
"where the parties to a fraudulent, or, even, an illegal contract,
have fully executed it themselves, in which courts of justice will
not interfere to unravel their doings; but, considering them in
yari delioto, will leave them bound as they find them: 5 Barr
81 ; 12 Harris 62; 1 Jones 212 ; 3 Casey 90. And he adds,
what is an important test in cases like this, a "contract, however, which remains to be executed; which stands in need
of a decree of a court of justice to enable the parties to reap
its fruits, and which is successfully impeached as covinous and
fraudulent in fact, is easily distinguished from all such cases (executed contracts), and rests on a foundation of sand."
Was the judgment in this case an execution of the contract or
transaction on which it was founded, so as to put it out of the
power of the defendant to retrace his steps by alleging the fraudulent purpose of it? I certainly think it was. The pleadings in
a suit are said in the elementary books to be the "mutual altercations between the parties." The next step is the trial, and this
ascertains which party is right in their altercations. Then follows
the judgment, which is the conclusion of the law, and is said to
be the end of the law in regard to the controversy. All after
that in execution of the judgment is ministerial, excepting where
it may be judicial in aid of ministerial action. The judgment is
to all intents and purposes conclusive on all matters pleaded. or
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which might properly have been pleaded. So in judgments by
confession the same principle exists. If one confess a judgment
to another, with a full knowledge of its fraudulent purpose, and
without being in any manner induced thereto, excepting as a confederate, he cannot in any sense be said to be defrauded, for he
knew what he was about and intended what he did. The judgment, therefore, as to him, being without fraud as between him
and the party to whom it is confessed, cannot be impeached for
fraud when none such was attempted to be shown.
The common law makes that which .is fraudulent in fact, void;
but in all cases of confederated fraud, its maxim is in yari delicto,
potior est conditio defendentis. Neither party will be aided or
relieved against a contract executed by him. The statute of 18
Elizabeth has nothing to do with such cases. It declares void all
contracts .intended to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors, against
the parties intended to be defrauded; but leaves it, as between
the parties, as it was at common law ; subject only to be affected,
if not within the maxim, by actual fraud between the parties.
If parties concoct a scheme to defraud others, and resort to a
judgment to effect their object, both having in view the same
thing, there is no fraud between them, assuredly, of whidh either
can complain or call on a court for relief. Courts will not move
to change the condition of the parties any more readily in such
case than they would to enforce an executory contract, which as
a general rule they will not do. These 'are the principles of the
authorities cited from 1 Win. Black. Rep. 864; 6 Watts 458;
5 Casey 219; 'to which many more might be added.
In this case the defendant was. indulged with an issue to try
the question of fraud in the judgment-fraud between themselves,
for no others were party to the* issue. The proof,.however, fell
short of this; it showed that the judgment was confessed by the
defendant to the plaintiff to defraud the defendant's creditors, in
which both participated; and this is just where the learned judge
erred, for he held, and so charged, that if this was the purpose
of the judgment it was "legally invalid for any purpose ;" and,
"as it was not executed or collected, the law will not lend its aid
for its enforcement." It should have been remembered that the
law will not lend its aid to relieve a party against the effect of
his own fraud, any more than it will aid to enforce frauduleiit
contracts. It leaves both as it finds them. That the judgment
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was not collected was not the test that the contract out of which
it sprung was executory. That was merged in the judgment, and
concluded by it, and needed not the aid of a court to reach its
fruits. Process of execution, which is of course, was all that was
needed.
We think in this treatment of the case the learned judge lost
sight of the great principle of the case, embraced in the maxim.Nemo allegans suam turpitudinemorder to avoid his acts.
The very reverse of this was held when the learned judge allowed
the proof to be sufficient to relieve the defendant; which showed
that he had confessed the judgment to defraud others without
having been led into it by the fraud of the party to whom he confessed it. If he was cheated- by his own machinery, he cheated
himself, and must abide it; but this was not the effect given to
his acts in the view the learned judge seems to have taken of
them. The effect, unperceived, of course, by the learned judge,
was to give the defendant a chance of escaping the consequences
of his own fraud after having tried it, perhaps successfully, on
his creditors. This is not our understanding of what should be
the proper administration of the law in such cases, as is apparent
from what has been already said.
Our conclusion is that the court below erred in holding the
judgment to be executory between the parties; and in charging
as we have already pointed out they did, and which is the substance of the second, third, and fourth assignments of error.
For these reasons the judgment in the issue muit be rdversed.
We have nothing to say in regard to the prepared set-off of
this judgment; that is not before us. If the judgment is not
otherwise impeached, it will depend on equitable principles
whether it will be a set-off against the defendant's judgment or
not: that will be determined at the proper time.
Judgment reversed, and venire de novo awarded.
There can be no question about the
correctness of the decision in the foregoing case, at least in Pennsylvania ;
but we have been unable to agree with
the opinion in the principal point upon
which the decision rests-that a judgment is an executed contract.
It is undoubted that a well-settled
distinction in cases of par ddictum, is

between executed and executory contracts; and it is said, generally, that
courts will not undo the former, nor
enforce the latter, or aid the parties
thereto.
But what is an executed contract?
Blackstone (Book II., p. 443) says, '1 It
is where two agree to do a thing, and
they do it immediately, in which case the
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possession and the right are transferred
together ; and a contract is executory,
if they agree to do a thing in the future,
when the riglit only vests. A contract
executed conveys a chose in possession;
a contract executory conveys only a
chose in atdion."
Kent (Book R., p. *449) applies the
ordinary definition of a contract to an
executory one only; for, as Blackstone
says, "A contract executed differs nothing from a grant." In Story on Contracts, s.18, it is said: "An executed
contract is one in which nothing remains
to be done by either party, and where
the transaction is completed at the moment that the agreement is made. An
executory contract is one to do some
future act."
No better definitions than the above
can be found. They seem to furnish a
fair criterion between the two. classes;
whether or not anything is still to be
done by either party, to perform the
object of the contract.
Is the judgment of a court an executed
contract ? (for the question is not
whether it be an execution of a preceding one, but, what is it, itself?) Certainly not, in the sense of the foregoing
definitions. A judgment is a contract
of the highest nature, being a debt of
record. It concludes all matters in controversy between the parties, and fixes
a certain amount due from one to the
other. The original contract, upon
which it is founded, is merged in the
higher matter, which is now substituted
for it. But it is not yet paid. There
is still something to be done by the
judgment-debtor, and that, the very
object and only obligation thereof on
his part. Until payment thereof, it
certainly is not performed and executed.
The plaintiff's right-to a certain sum
of money, which was in action before
the judgment, is still in action-there is
only now a higher and better evidence
of it.

It is true, a judgment does not IIstand
in need of a further detree of a court
of justice to enable a party to reap its
fruits," but this is not believed to be the
test between executed and executory
contracts; and when WoonwA u, J.,
used such language in Miller's Appeal,
6 Casey 492, he did not lay it down as
a criterion, but was reciting a quality
of some executory contracts.
The case of Baker v. Lukens, 11
Casey 146, is certainly opposed to this
view. The court there refused to strike
off a judgment, because the bond and
warrant were dated on Sunday, on the
ground that the warrant became a contract executed oxi entry of judgment.
The only authority referred to, ShTuman
v. Shiuman, 3 Casey 94, was the case of a
deed of conveyance, delivered on Sunday. The contract undoubtedly was
fully executed thereby, for right and
possession both passed. As the court
said, p.. 95, "Nothing more remained
to be done." But a bond executed on
Sunday is void: Fox v. Mensch, 3 W.
& S. 444. A warrant of attorney cannot be of any greater value, and it is
submitted that a judgment entered
thereon has no foundation. It is begging the question, moreover, to say that
-the warrant was executed by entry; the
very point is, whether it was properly
entered or not.
- On the other hand, in the case of Gill
v. Webb, 4 Monroe 299, a judgment was
recovered upon a note given for money
won at gaming, and it was enjoined for
the amount unpaid; but it was held that
any paid thereon could not be recovered
back. The report of the case is meagre,
but it must have proceeded.on the ground
that the judgment was executed, to the
amount paid thereon, and executbry for
the balance.
Will an executory contract, entbred
into by two persons, to defraud the creditors of one, be enforced between them ?
This question, we believe, is not to be
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answered in the same way as in the case
of executed contracts, by the application
of the maxim "1in pari ddicto, melior
est conditio defendentis." That is properly invoked when the application is'to
rescind and cancel, or an attempt made
to recover something parted with. The
courts will have nothing to do with such
cases; they leave the parties in the condition they have placed themselves. If
contracts affected with illegality- or confederated fraud are executory, the question of their worth and whether any
rcovcry can be had thereupon, rests
upon the proper application of the maxims " E x turpi causa, non oritur actio,"
and " Nea allegans suam turpitudinem est audiendus."
And a well-founded distinction is here
made between illegal contracts and those
made for fraudulent purposes. The
former cannot in any case be enforced
or recovered upon, and their illegality
may be as well shown by defendant as
the plaintiff. But, in cases of confederated fraud, the transaction is not a
nullity, it is voidable by third persons
against whom the fraud is directed ; but
between the parties it is perfectly good;
*as to them, no fraud exists. Can one,
then, recover against the other upon
such an executory contract?
The American cases seem about
equallydivided. In Stewart v. Kearney,
6 Watts 453, Ginsox, C. J., speaking
of a contract in fraud of creditors as
between the parties, said: "The law
not only sustains the contract when
executed, but enforces it when executory." The question is fully met in
Sherk v. Endress, 3W. & S. 255. That
was an action of debt and set-off pleaded,
the subjects of which were a judgment,
a bond, and a sealed note. Replication,
that they were given to delay and defraud plaintiff's creditors. GiBso-T, C.
J., said: "1T'he bond and judgment are
undoubtedly fraudulent in regard to
creditors, but were binding and perfectly

fair between the parties. There is fraud
only in relation to third persons; in any
other aspect there is no fraud whatever,
and it is unimportant whether the contract is used to found a claim betixt the
parties to it, or to rebut one ; it is fre6
from taint in regard to them, and one
may use it against the other for any purpose whatever." And judgment for the
plaintiff below was reversed.
The law on the subject of contracts
between confederates in fraud for the
purpose of deceiving a third person, was
carefully considered in the cases of Evans
v. Dravoi 12 Harris 62, and Hendrickson
v. Evans, 1 Casey 441. They were
separate actions on a bond, given in part
consideration of real estate conveyed,
for the purpose of inducing the grantor's
wife to sign the deed, but under an agreement, between the husband and vendee,
that it should not be collected. WooDwARD, J., stated the question to be,
whether obligors in a fraudulent bond
can shield themselves from liability by
alleging their own fraud. He said:
"That at law nothing but payment
would discharge the bond, and the defendant can only be relieved by the
interposition of equity. That the plaintiff needs no aid from equity; he stands
on his legal rights. Thd defendant is
in that posture, asking that the plaintiff
may be restrained and the bond cancelled." The application of the maxim
"in purdelicto" to the plaintiff was
denied, because he needed no assistance
from the fraud to make out his case.
And the court held that the plaintiff had
a perfect cause of action-the instrument
was unimpeachable, and they would not
allow the defendant to show its fraudulent purpose.
In the second suit, I Casey, the matter
was re-argued, and a review asked of the
former decision, as opposed to the maxim
"in par ddicto." But the court affirmed their first ruling, and they remarked
further that, "as the fraudulent trans-
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* action did not appear on the face of the court held the sale binding between the
bond, but was interposed by way of de- parties, and that it constituted a valid
fence by the obligor, he became the consideration for the note. They said,
actor, and the maxim applied against p. 258, "It is true that the law will not
him, and not in his favor."
exert its power to execute fraudulent
These cases establish the doctrine that contracts. But we have already shown
par delictum will not be listened to in that the parties to this contract of sale
defence to an action at law wherein the may not show its collusive character,
plaintiff has a complete legal right, with- and therefore, as between them, it is not
out resorting to the common fault. The to be regarded as either fraudulent or
principle is to stop the first party who void. II
alleges his own turpitude. They fully
Starke v. Littlepage, 4 Rand. 368, was
support the principal case. There the an action to recover slaves sold, but not
defendant came into court upon an delivered, for purpose of protecting them
application emphatically to their equi- from defendant's creditors. The vendee
table powers, to relieve him from the was held entitled to recover. The court
consequences of his fraud. The court said, p. 372, "If it be necessary, -in
order to discountenance transactions
need only have refused to hear him.
The court infer (12 Harris 67) that against policy of the law, to enforce
their decision is not applicable to con- such a contract, it will be done, though
tracts forbidden by statute or contra both parties are in pari delicto. A party
bonos ores. In these cases the rights is not allowed to allege his own turpiof parties will always be secondary to tude in such cases when defendant at
the vindication of the law, which will law, whenever the refusal to execute the
not allow any one to succeed by its contract would give effect to the original
fraudulent purpose, and encourage parinfraction.
In cases of mere fraud, inter partici- ties engaging in such transactions."
And it was held in Smith v. Quartz,
pes, its objects are best attained by
stamping liability upon all attempts 14 Cal. 242, that a note given for proin furtherance of the design. The opin- perty conveyed in fraud of creditors is
ion of the court forcibly states the con- valid, so long as neither creditors nor
-the seller deny the validity of the sale.
siderations of the law in this respect.
On the other hand, any distinction
The question of executory contracts
in fraud of creditors has arisen in other between covin and illegality has been
states, mostly upon attempts to recover denied, and many state courts have reupon bonds, notes, &c., given in con- fused to enforce contracts of an execusideration of the fraudulent conveyance, tory nature, made for the purpose of
sale, &c.
defrauding creditors.
In 1Xndley v. Cooley, 1 Blackf. 262,
In Smith v. Hubbs, 1 Fairf. 71, the
it was held that the vendee of real estate action was for the price of personal procannot resist payment of a note given perty, sold to defraud creditors. The
- for the purchase-money, because the court allowed the defendant to show the
grantor made the conveyance to defraud fraud in defence, and, after considerable
his creditors, and this doctrine was examination, denied that there-was any
favored in Fairbanks v. Blackington, 9 legal distinction as to the source from
Pick. 93. In Dyier v. Homer, 22 Pick. which the evidence of covin or illegality
253, a note was given in consideration is to be derived in actions on executory
for a bill of sale of chattels, not delivered, contracts. And Tucker v. Smith, 4
given to defraud vendor's creditors. The Green. 415, allowed the defence to show
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the fraudulent consideration of a promissory note, given by father to son, to
defraud the Unit'ed States by decreasing
former's pronperty, to have his name pat
on pension roll.
The matter hos been fully considered
in New York. Nellis v. Clark, 20
Wend. 24; was a suit on a note given
in part consideration for fraudulent conveyance of land. It was held that the
fraudulent nature of the contract may
be shown by deendant, and that plaintiff' could not recover. 'NELSON, C. J.,
dissented. The judgment was affirmed.
in the Court of Appeals, 4 Hill 424.
v. Best, 10 Barb. 369. deAnd ,'Vh-'r
cides where property is sold for the purpose of defrauding creditors and a note
taken to secure payment, the contract
eing ilkl--I d voi, no action will li'e

laid down by the A. Vice-Chancellor
of the same state in 1843, in Conover v.
Brusl, 2 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 289, that the
court will not allow one who has confessed a judgment without an adequat$
consideration for the prpose of defrauding his creditors, to impair it or set it

aside. We find this case in Abbott's
Digest, but have not been able to see the
report, and cannot speak of the grounds
of the decision.
The New York cases were approved in
Gondy v. Geblart, I Ohio St. Rep. 262,
which was on a bond, the consideration
of which was a sale made to defraud
creditor:, both parties having been guilty
of fraudulent intent. The court said:
IIProof of the fraud may come from the
defendant."
10 Verger 228 and Norris v. Norm-is, 9
by payee to recover on such note. Where Dana 307, are to the same general effect.
the contract is executory, law will See also .Rochelle v. Harrison, 9 Porter
neither enforce it, nor give damages for 351.
its breach.
T. H., JRi.

We find it, however, to have been

Court qf Appeals of New York.
CHAUNCEY BARNARD v. JOHN B. MONNOT.
The duty of a real-estate broker consists in bringing the minds of the vendor and
vendee to an agreement concerning the sale.
It is not necessary that a binding contract, in writing, should be entered into
by the parties, before the broker becomes entitled to commissions.
Therefore, where the parties are brought together by the broker and agree upon
a sale at a certain price and upon certain terms of payment, the broker has earned
his commissions, though the sale afterwards fails through the unwillingness of the
party who employed him, to fulfil his bargain.

Tis was an action by a real estate broker to recover his commissions on the sale of what was known as -the "Hippodrome
property," in New York.
On the trial plaintiff proved that he was employed by defendant
to negotiate a sale of said property at the price named, $250,000.
Plaintiff had some negotiation.s with one Eno, who made several
VOL. XV.-14
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offers for the property, all of which plaintiff reported to defendant,
who rejected them and made counter-propositions on his part.
The parties then met in plaintiff's office, and after conversation
in plaintiff's presence, came to an agreement as to the purchase,
the price, and the terms of payment, and left the plaintiff's office
together to go to Mr. Wetmore's, Eno's counsel. On the way
they stopped at the office of defendant's counsel, Mr. Logan, who
went with them to Mr. Wetmore's, where the terms were again
stated, and it was arranged that Mr. Logan should draw the
,contract.
Subsequently, Logan, on the part of defendant, made objections
to the leases on some of the property that defendant was to receive
in exchange for the Hippodrome lot, on which Eno offered to
remove the leases and give the property clear of them. Further
objection, however, was made by defendant, and the sale, in that
form, fell through, though the parties subsequently consummated
a new bargain for a portion of the Hippodrome property at

.$170,o00.

Upon this evidence the judge presiding at the trial directed a
nonsuit, and this was subsequently affirmed by the court in
General Term. See the case 'reported, at length, in 34 Barbour 90.
Horace Barnard and Alexander S. Johnson, for appellant,
who was plaintiff below.
The plaintiff was entitled to recover because1. The function: of a broker is to bring vendor and vendee
together, so that their minds meet in' a bargain. He has no
,power t9 make a contract in writing for the sale of land, and
consequently no duty in respect thereto. Such a-contract would
have been solely to bind the parties, which the broker had no
'authority or power to do: Coleman v. 'Uarrigan,18 Barb. 67 ;
Wlentworth v. Luther, 21 Id. 145; Holly v. Gosling, 3 E. D.
Smith 262; Cliilton v. Butler, 1 Id. 150; Beebe v. Roberts, 3
Id. 194.
2. Eno having been willing to make a written contract or to
'carry out the bargain without one, and even to make terms more
-favorable to'defendant than those agreed upon, such contract
would not have effected anything in regard to him, and defendant
was solely and entirely responsible for the failure of the bargain,
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and he,cannot be allowed to allege his own wrongful, act as a sufficient ground to defeat the plaintiff's claim: .Moses v. Bierbing,
81 N. Y. 462; Doty v. Miler, 43 Barb. 529;
-Gqavock v.
Woodlief, 20 How. U. S. 221 ; Hoc7k v. Jrmmerling, 22 Id. 69.'
.EdgarLogan and Amasa J.Parker, for appellee:-

1. To entitle a real estate broker to commissions for effecting
a sale there must be a binding contract between the parties, the
signing of which is a condition precedent to the earning of the
broker's commission. After the parties have agreed -upon the
price of the property, many things yet remain to be settled which
do not arise and appear until lawyers are called in to make the
written contract in detail for the parties: Glentworthkv. Luher,
21 Barb. 14'[; Broad v. Thomas, 7 Bingham, 99; Story on
Agency, § 829; Coleman v. qarrigues,18 Barb. 68.
2. The minds of Eno and the defendant never met upon any
essential details of the bargain by parol. It was an exchange of
real estate, and the defendant knew nothing of the properties
proposed to be given him by Eno, and he merely assented to the
exchange provided he and his counsel were satisfied upon inquiry
that the representations as to rents, &c., of the properties, were
true. He found out they were not true, and therefore refused to
complete a bargain. It was a mere negotiation, not a bargain,
.and the subsequent sale of part of defendant's lot to the same
purchaser was a new and separate transaction with .which the
plaintiff had no connection.
S. The evidence shows that plaintiff was the, agent or broker
of Eno to make a purchase. The jury would not have been
warranted in finding that the defendant retained the plaintiff as
his broker.
The opinion of the court was delivered hy
HuNT, J.-The plaintiff brought his action in the Supreme
Court against the defendant, to recover his compensation as a
real estate broker, amounting to $2500, in effecting the sale of
the '-Hippodrome" property in the city of New York.
On the trial the plaintiff was nonsuited.
The judgment was affirmed at the General Term of the First
District. The facts may be stated as follows:the city of New York,
The plaintiff, a real estate broker in"
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was employed by the defendant to negotiate a sale of certain real
property of the defendant, known as the " Hippodrome" property,
for the price of $250,000.
He brought his negotiations to a successful issue on the 31st
of May 1855, when the defendant and one Amos R. Eno came to
an agreement, which was complete in all its terms, for the sale
and purchase of the property.
The defendant agreed to sell to Eno the " Hippodrome" property for $250,000, and Eno agreed to buy it at that price, to be
paid as follows: $20,000 in cash, No. 555 Broadway at $120,000,
and No. 74 Broadway at $110,000.
To these terms both parties were agreed.
The parties having agreed upon the terms of their bargain, set
out for the office of Mr. Wetmore, Eno's lawyer, to put the agreement in writing. They stopped on the way at the office of Mr.
Logan, Monnot's lawyer, and stated to him the terms of the
agreement; at Mr. Wetmore's office the terms were again stated,
and it was arranged that Mr. Logan should draw the contract.
Subsequently Mr. Logan, on behalf of Monnot, objected to
certain leases which were on the pieces of property which Monnot
was to receive, though they had been discussed and agreed upon
by Monnot and Eno.
Upon this objection being started, Eno offered to remove the
leases and give the property clear of them.
Eno was ready to carry out the contract, and no farther objection was made on account of the leases. Monnot subsequently
declined to perform the contract, alleging the unwillingness of
his wife to its completion. Another bargain was therefore made
and completed between Eno and the defendant, by which Eno
-purchased of defendant a portion of the "1Hippodrome" property
to the value of $170,000, and paid him" for it by 74 Broadway
and assuming certain mortgages.
The plaintiff was nonsuited upon the ground that he could not
maintain an action for his- compensation, until the agreement for
the sale of the property had been reduced to writing and signed
by the parties. The general tenor of the written opinion in the
court below concurred in this view of the law.
I think the decision was erroneous. The -duty of the broker
consisted in bringing the minds of the vendor and vendee to 'an
hgrpement. He could' do no more. He had no power to execute
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a contract, to pay the money for the one side, to convey the land
on the part of the other, or to compel the performance by either,
of their duties. The plaintiff produced a purchaser willing and
ready to accept the terms of the defendant, and able to perform,
the obligation on his part. He had then earned his commissions,
ani it would be a singular conclusion of the law, that the refusal
of his employer to complete the bargain should destroy his right
to them. His right to the commissions depended upon the
successful performance of the service and upon nothing else.
On the one hand, however much time he might devote to the
interests of the defendant, unless he was successful in finding a
purchaser, he was entitled to no compensation, and on the other
his right was perfect so soon as that condition was performed:
Moses v. Bierhing, 31 N. Y. 462; Mocaavoclk v. Woodlief, 20
How. U. S. 221; Kock v. .Emmerling, 22 Id. 69. In the case
last cited, as in the present, the broad ground was assumed " that
no contract of this character can be specifically enforced, unless
it be fully executed :" p. 73. The court say, "1Where the vendor
is satisfied with the terms made by himself through the broker, to
the purchaser, and no solid objection can be stated to the contract; it would seem to be clear that the commission of the agent
was due and ought to be paid. It would be a novel principle,
if the vendor might capriciously defeat his own contract with his
-agent by refusing to pay him, when he had done all that he was
bound to do. The agent might well undertake to propure a purchaser, but this being done, his labor and expense could not avail
him, as he could not coerce a willingness to pay the commission,
which the vendor had agreed to pay. Such a state of things
could only arise from an express understanding, that the vendor
was to pay nothing, unless he chose to make the sale."
Judgment should be reversed and new trial ordered.

CONVERSE ET AL. v. TRANSPORTATION CO.

Supreme Court of .Errorsof Connecticut.
EILTAB A. CONVERSE ET AL. v. THE NORWICH AND NEW YORK
TRANSPORTATION CO.
The defendants were common carriers of goods and passengers between New
York and New London, by steamers. A delivery of a package to them in NeW
York for transportation, marked for a point beyond their route, and the acceptance
of-the same, implies an obligation to carry according to the general course and
usage of their business ; that is, to the termination of their own route and to deliver
to the next carrier in the line of the destination.
A contract between two lines of transportation, as to the rate of division between
them, of through freight, and which does not create a joint interest either in the
profits or the management of the business on the two lines, does not make the first
line responsible for transportation across both lines merely-because it accepts for
transportation a package directed to a point upon the second line.
Where a railway company and a transportation company use a wharf as a joint
depot or station-house for freight, and each delivers freight for the other's line upon
a platform at particular points clearly defined and well understood, either company
having transported freight across its own line and deposited it in the place agreed
for its reception by the other, must be regarded as having completed its duty of
transportation and delivery to the next carrier in the line.

A..P.. yde and

. L. Strong, for plaintiffs.

Charles Chkapman and J. Halsey, for defendants.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
BuTLER, J.-The evidence in this case is very clear and free
from contradiction.

Upon a careful and deliberate consideration

of it, we are satisfied that it did not justify the jury in finding a
contract to carry the wool to Stafford, alone, or in company with
the Northern road; and that it does not show an actual delivery
to that road, as an independent and next carrier in a line, and a
performance of all that the defendants inpliedly undertook to do;
and therefore that the verdict cannot be sustained.
1. In the first place there is no such evidence of a contract to

carry the wool to Stafford, as will support the first count of the
declaration.
The defendants were a corporation, organized under the Joint
Stock Law of this state. Their articles of association are in evidence. The object of their association is therein declared to be
"the transp6rtation of mails, freight, and passengers between
New York and New London and Norwich, or other places, &c."
The transportation contemplated from New York is intended to
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be, and was in fact, by water. By the articles the terminus
where it was to end, and whether on the coast or inland, is not
fixed definitely. But that is unimportant in this connection.
Their business, as then actually and permanently established, wasconducted by steamers from New York to New London only, and
a delivery there to citizens of the place, or the railroads which
had their termini at that point. That was the fixed course and
usage of their business as carriers. In the absence of any express
contract, the law implies from the delivery and acceptance of
goods for carriage a contract to carry according to the course and
isage of the carrier's business, and, if marked for a point beyond
his terminus, to deliver them to the next carrier on the route.
Here there was no express contract. No verbal agreement was
made. The wool was received and a written receipt given in
these words: " Received from John M. Pendleton & Go., in good
order, on board the Norwich and Worcester boat, bound for Stafford, Conn., the following packages, &c." That does not import
a promise to carry to Stafford. Read in the light of surrounding
circumstances, it is a mere acknowledgment of the receipt of
the wool, and that it, and not the steamer, was "boundi for,"
i. e., directed to, marked for Stafford; and the plaintiff's case
would have been just as strong, if the simple facts of the receipt
of the wool and the marks had been found by other and verbal
evidence. The receipt given in Elmore v. The Naugatuck
Railroad Co. was much stronger, and yet holden a mere
acknowledgment.
Nor is there any unexplained evidence that the defendants
held themselves out, in any manner, as carriers to Stafford, and
that the plaintiffs were thereby misled.. There was no. advertising
or other representation to that effect, nor was pay taken in advance
for the whole distance. There was evidence of the carriage, at
prior times, of other goods of the plaintiffs upon the boat of the
defendants, and that the defendants made out and collected the
bills for their carriage the whole distance. Unexplained that
would tend strongly to show, that such was their established course
of business. But that is explained; and it is shown that, in so
collecting the freights on the railroad, they were in fact but the
agents of that road, and collecting as a matter of convenience to
both. There is nothing else to show a contract to carry to Staf.
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ford ; and it is a case of mere reception to carry according to the
fixed course of the business as conducted by the carrier.
The question whether the mere receipt of goods marked for and
destined to a place beyond the terminus of a carrier's route is,
primd facie, evidence of a contract to carry to the place of destination, is not now an open one, in this state.
It has-been settled by the three cases of Hood v. N. Y. & N.
H. Railroad Co., 22 Conn. 1; Almore v. The Yaugatuck Railroad Co., 23 Id. 457, and The Naugatuc7 Railroad Co. v. The
Waterbury Button Co., 24 Id. 468. Not, indeed, in accordance
with the law as recognised in England, but adversely and in
accordance with what is deemed sound policy for this extended
country and the current of decision here, especially in the large
commercial states where the most lines and the greatest amount
of carriage exist.
But it is claimed that if there was no express contract, there
was an implied one; because, by reason of their connection with
the Northern road, the defendants were carriers in fact to Stafford. If the facts were so, the defendants would be liable. But
the fact was not so, and the evidence did not justify the jury in

finding it.
There was a contract between the corporations, which was in
evidence. It did not establish, and was not intended to establish,
between them any community of profit and loss; or of management or expense; and did not constitute them partners. Each
was entitled under it to continue to transport independently, both
in relation to the management of and the expense upon their 9wn
routes, and between their respective termini.
It was.-an agreement relative to the amount of their respective
charges, or rather respecting a proportionate division of the
charges on through freight, and on that only; and for certain
conveniences for the mutual delivery of such freight. It did not
and could not make the defendants so carriers in fact to S fford,
that the law will imply a contract by the defendants to carry
there, from the mere receipt by them of the goods marked for
that place.
2. The defendants insist in the second place that if a contract
could be foulid or implied from the facts as in evidence, they
could not be holden liable; because their directors had no legal
power to make such a contract which would bind the company;
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and they rely on the case of Hood v. The N. Y. & N. H. Bailroad Co., 22 Conn. 502. The plaintiffs insist that the case is in
conflict with the whole current of authority, both in England and
this country, and is not law.
That case cannot be overruled or shaken on the ground that
the principles there applied are technically wrong. The principle
is fundamental and elementary, that the power of a corporation
is limited to the powers conferred. by the charter and such as are
necessarily incidental thereto. The courts of other states in the
cases cited have not questioned or disregarded that principle.
But corporations have within a few years, under general laws,
become so numerous, and are so connected with and so control
the business of the country, and even its religious and benevolent
agencies, that the courts have gradually come to think it necessary to relax the technical and theoretical strictness of the legal
principles applicable to them, and subject them to the same liabilities for the acts -of their agents as natural persons, so far as it
can be done, practically and consistently with their charters.
The very rapid increase of these corporations, which now
monopolize the business of land-carriage and a large share of that
which is done by water, and the equally rapid increase in the
quantity of freight which they carry, destined to points beyond
their chartered termini, render it desirable for them and the
business community that they should have power to make business
connections and contracts with each other, and assume a joint
responsibility for carriage beyond the termination of their routes,
and the tendency of the courts is almost universal to recognise
their power to do so, when the purpose is auxiliary, beneficial,
and within a reasonable limit, as an intended or necessary and
incidental power by a liberal construction of legislative grants.
Whether we ought so to regard these changes, and follow this
prevailing tendency, and relax the strictness of the rule by such
a liberal construction in respect to the intention of the legislature
or the necessity for such an incidental power, either because it is
wise to .do so, or for the sake of uniformity, or whether we should
hold to the maxim of stare decisis and adhere to the old and
strict construction adopted in the case relied upon, it is not
necessary now to determine. There is no contract to carry
beyond the terminus of the defendants' route proved by the'
evidence, and the question is not a material one in the case.
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3. The remaiiiing question, viz., whether there was or not a
performance of the contracts set up in the second count, and an
actual delivery to and acceptance by the Northern road, so that
the responsibility was shifted on to that corporation, is one we
have deliberately considered and feel constrained to decide in the
affirmative. It must be conceded that the defendants had transported the wool to their terminus, and carried and placed it in
the common depot by the side. of the railroad track, at a spot
where they by usage were expected by the Northern road to
place it, and that no other or further act of carriage, or actual
manual possession, was or could be expected of them.
And so it must be conceded that actual manual possession had
not been taken by the Northern road, nor is there any direct
evidence of an express agreement that the carriage to and placing
at the side of the track in the depot should be deem3ed a delivery
to the road. And at first sight it would seem just and equitable
to hold that the carriage in fact was finished by the transportation
company, and that the goods were in deposit, by mutual agreement in a joint depot, to await an actual manual reception by the
Northern road at a future convenient hour; and so looking to
the equities of the case and the large amount involved in the
other cases, dependent upon the decision of this, we should be
very willing to hold, if we could do so consistently with principle.
But there are insuperable difficulties in such a view of the case.
We have no difficulty in -determining, indeed we must hold,
that there was a mutual agreement that the transportation company should place the through freight at that precise spot, and
that the Northern road should take it from thence, at a time convenient to them. The construction of the depot and the uniform
usage are conclusive of it. The depot was constructed with a
platform, by the side of the track, for the reception of goods to
be taken from or put into the cars. And on that platform the
railroad company,. in the first and every instance of delivery by
them, placed their freight, and the transportation. company at
their convenience took it away and carried it on board their boat;
and so the transportation company in like manner in the first and
every instance placed there the freight for the Northern road,
and they at their convenience put it in their cars and took it
away. And the usage was precisely the same with the Worcester
road. It would be a forced construction of this usage, or rather
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the agrecmenb inferrible from it, to say that an intermediate joint
deposit was contemplated. Moreover the depot was not the joint
depot of the two parties only, or erected for that purpose only,
but the joint depot of three, including the Worcester road, and
erected for and used by each, not only for the mutual delivery,
and reception of through freight, but independently in transacting
their independent local business. Again, the defendants were
carriers by water, and their place for landing and delivery must
necessarily or would naturally be a wharf. This depot was a
wharf, covered and enclosed indeed, but still a wharf and the
only one occupied by them. Upon this wharf and into the enclosure the Northern road laid their track, for the delivery and
reception of freight to and from the transportation company.
Both parties then contemplated a delivery and reception on this
wharf and in this enclosure, and obviously in the precise manner
actually pursued. If a carrier by water notifies the consignee
of his arrival and readiness to deliver the goods, and the consignee says to him, 1 land them in a particular place on a particular wharf, and I will take them away at my convenience," and
he so lands them. it is a delivery. And what he says in a particular case expressly, he may say for all cases and by his conduct
or by usage. And so these connecting carriers practically, if not
expressly, said to each other. It is clear, then, that both the
transportation company and the Northern road contemplated that
a placing of freight by either, intended for the other, upon that
platform, was all that either was to do, by way of delivery of
their freight to each other: that they did not contemplate such
placing as an intermediate deposit, to be watched by the party
depositing, or as a joint deposit, at the joint risk and in the joint
possession of both; but that they relied on the enclosure as a
protection, and considered the placing of the freight in the usual
spot upon the platform as a delivery.
The minor facts respecting the time and manner of delivering
the way bills, the examination of the freight, and the checkdng
of the way bills to be sure that all had been delivered, the proportionate extent and the manner of their joint use and possession
of the depot, the looking up or paying for missing goods, and the
practice of letting the Saturday freight remain on the platform
until Monday morning, are only material as they bear upon the
great question, viz., what was it agreed or understood, between
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the defendants aid the Northern road, should constitute a delivery
from one to the other. It iz sufficient to say, that they all tend
to confirm, rather than to rebut, the inference drawn from the
original construction of the depot and platform, and the uniform
practice and usage respecting their use.
A new trial must be advised.
In this opinion the other judges concurred, except PARK, J.,
who, having tried the case in the court below, did not sit.
The propositions maintained in the
foregoing case are so obvious and so
well established, that very little cornment is required. The question of what
shall amount, practically and legally, to
a delivery to the next carrier upon the

route, is one of importance, and this
case affords another illustration of the
application of familiar principles, and is
therefore important to the profession.
I. F. R.

District Court of Appeals of Virginia. -FirstcTudicial Distri't.
EDGAR TUCKER v. WATSON, McGILL & CO.

-

Commercial intercourse between parties in the Northern and Southern states
during the late rebellion having been prohibited, both by the general rules of public
law, and expressly by the Act of Congress of 13th July 1861 and the President's

proclamation in pursuance thereof, interest was suspended on debts due by persons
in the territory of either belligerent to persons in the territory of the other.
Nor did such a debt begin to bear interest by reason of the presence of the

creditor at the residence of the debtor and his demand for payment, unless he had
abandoned his residence in the hostile territory and taken such measures as the
rules and policy of the debtor's government prescribed to change his status as an

enemy.

THIS was an action of assumpsit, by .Watson, McGill & Co.,
of Petersburg, Va., who are defendants in error, against Tucker,
Whitin & Carere, in the Circuit Court. Tucker, the jiaintiff in
error, was the only one of the defendants served. Upon the trial
the case was withdrawn from the jury and submitted to the court
on a statement of facts agreed upon by counsel, as follows: "For
several years previous to the year 1861, the plaintiffs, who were
manufacturers of tobacco in Petersburg, Va., were in the habit
(at the special instance and request of the defendants) of sending
to the defendants, who were commission merchants in the city of
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Boston, in the state of Massachusetts, their manufactured tobacco
for sale upon commission, and drawing drafts upon them, the said
defendants, for the proceeds of the sales of said tobacco, after
sales had been effected. That in consequence of such transactions, the defendants, on the 11th day of October 1861, were
indebted to the plaintiffs in the sum of $2802.95, the balance due
on that day as per account current rendered to the plaintiffs by
the defendants. On the 1st day of August 1865, the defendants
paid the plaintiffs the sum*of $800, and on the 14th day of September 1865, the further sum of $2502.95, making together the
aforesaid principal sum of $2802.95 due on the 18th of October,
1861, as aforesaid. The legal rate of interest in the state of Massachusetts is six per centum per annum. The defendants refused
to allow and pay to the plaintiffs any interest whatever upon said
principal balance of $2802.95, and still refuse to pay them
interest thereon except from and after the 1st day of May 1865,
which day is assumed as the end of the late war. The plaintiffs
insisted, and still insist, that they are entitled to demand and
receive interest on said balance of $2802.95 from the 16th day
of October 1861, when it was due and payable, till paid, and
that the aforesaid payment of $300 and $2502.95 shall be
credited against said balance of principal and the interest thereon,
as payments made 1st August 1865 and 14th September 1865,
.respectively.
"It is also agreed that the said defenaants, during the whole
time since 16th October 1861, were and have beta solvent'merchants and traders, able to pay the aforesaid balance and interest.
It is also further agreed that in the fall of the year 1861, John
McGill, one of the plaintiffs, was in Canada and in the city of
Boston; that on the 4th and 18th days of September 1861, by
letters from Canada, and about the 1st October 1861, in person
in Boston, said McGill applied to defendants for payment of the
aforesaid balance due by them to the plaintiffs, which payment
the defendants refused to make, upon the ground that the President's proclamation of the 16th August 1861 made it unlawful
for them to make such payments. And in July 1863 and December 1863 the plaintiff McGill was again in Canada, and again
applied to defendants for payment of said balance, which was
again refused upon the same ground.
"If, upon the foregoing statement of facts, the coui-t shall be of
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opinion that tie 'defendants are not legally bound to pay to the
plaintiffs interest upon-said balance during the war, from the time
it was ascertained to be due, to wit, the 16th October 1865, till
paid, then judgment shall be given for the plaintiffs only for such
a sum of money as is equivalent to the interest which accrued
from and after the 1st day of May 1865, to wit, for the sum of
$61.12, with interest thereon from the 14th day of September
1865 till paid. But if the court shall be of opinion that the
defendants are legally bound to pay the interest aforesaid accrued
upon the balance aforesaid during the war, then judgment shall
be given for the plaintiffs for the sum of $657.75, with interest
thereon from the 14th day of September 1865 till paid."
Upon this case the Circuit Court gave judgment for the plaintiffs for $657.75, .with interest from 14th September 1865, and
thereupon the defendants appealed.
.B.B. Collier, for plaintiff in error.
John Lyon, for defendants in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Joyzms, P. J.-The only question submitted by the case
agreed was the right of the defendants in error to recover interest
for the period of the late war. The Circuit Court was of opinion
that, upon the facts a~reed, the defendants in error were entitled
to recover interest for that period, and gave judgment accordingly.
The correctnts of this judgment is now controverted by the plaintiff in error, on the ground that he and his partners resided in
the state of Massachusetts, while the defendants in error resided
in the state of Virginia, during the war, and that interest did
not run .during the war, where the debtor and creditor resided
respectively within the territories of the .opposing belligerents.
It is contended, however, by the counsel for the defendants in
error, that it does not appear, from the case agreed, that the
parties resided respectively in Massachusetts and Virginia during
the war, and that, as the right of the defendants in error to
recover interest during that period is not. controverted on any
'other ground than that above mentioned, the judgment ought to
be affirmed.
It is stated, among the facts agreed, that the defendants in
error were, for several years previous to the year 1861, "manu-"
facturers of tobacco in Petersburg, Va.," "and that the defend-
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ants," meaning the plaintiff in error and his partners, "1were
commission merchants in the city of Boston, in the state of Massachusetts."
In ascertaining the meaning of this agreement, we must not
apply any strict rules of verbal criticism, but must read it in the'
plain and ordinary sense of the language in which it is expressed:
Birch v. Alexander, 1 Wash. 84. Though it is not stated, in
so many words, that the parties resided respectively in Boston
and Petersburg, yet such is the "evident implication" from the
language. When it is said that a man is a clergyman, a physician, a lawyer, or a merchant, in a particular city, the common
use of language leads us to understand, in the absence of anything to the contrary, that he is a resident of that city, engagedthere in the calling specified. There is nothing in this case to
indicate that the parties did not reside in Petersburg and Boston,
respectively.
It appearing, then, from the facts agreed, that the parties,
previous to the year 1861, resided respectively in the states of
Massachusetts and Virginia, the presumption is, that they continued to do so after that time, in the absence of any proof to the
contrary: Starkie's Evidence (ed. 1860) p. 76. There is nothing
in the case to indicate that any one of the parties changed his
residence in the year 1861, or subsequently. On the contrary,
it appears distinctly that " the defendants," by which term the
plaintiff in error and his partners are described throughout
the case agreed, were still in Boston in September and October
1861 and in July and December 1863.
We are of opinion, therefore, that it sufficiently appears, from
the case agreed, that the parties resided, during the war, in the
states of Massachusetts and Virginia respectively.
But even if this were not so, it would not follow, as contended
by the counsel for the defendants in error, that the judgment
must be affirmed. The most that could be said would be, that it
is left in doubt, by the language of the case agreed, whether the
parties did or did not reside in those states respectively during
the war, and, in that view, the case agreed ought to be set aside
for uncertainty, and a venire de novo awarded: 1 Rob. (old)
Pract. 372, 374.
Taking the facts, then, to be, that the debtors in this case
resided, during the war, in the state of Massachusetts, and that
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the creditors resided, during .the same period, in the state of Virginia, the question presented for the decision of the court is,
whether interest for that period can be recovered.
In the state of hostilities which existed from 1861 to 1865,
between the United States, on the one hand, of which the state
of Massachusetts was one, and the organization of states known
as the Confederate States, on the other, of which the state of
Virginia was one, the people of Massachusetts and Virginia were
arrayed on opposite sides. The people of Virginia were, actually
and legally, the enemies of the people of Massachusetts, and that
'such was the relation between them has been repeatedly recognised by the decisions of the Supreme Court. And so it has
'been repeatedly held by that court, thatf, for all the purposes of

the present case, that conffict had all the incidents of a war, in
the common acceptation of that term: The Prize Cases, 2 Black
635; Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 2 Wallace 404; .The Venice, 2

Id. 258.
. During war, ell commercial intercourse With the subjects or
citizens of the enemy's country is prohibited by the general
principles of public law,-and in the late war, was expressly prohibited by the'Act of Congress passed July 13th 1861, and the
proclamation of the President, issued in pursuance thereof, on
the 16th August 1861.
The prohibition of commercial intercourse, thus made by the
general principles of public. law, and by the Act of Congress,
must be construed with reference to the objects in view, and must
be held to embrace all acts, in the nature of commercial intercourse, which might have a tendency to strengthen the resources
of the enemy. Thus, it is held, 'on general principles of law,
that the. remission of funds, in money or bills, to a subject of
thd enemy, is unlawful: 1 Kent 67. The payment of a debt to
the creditor in person, would stand.upon the same reason, and be
equally unlawful; and it could make no' difference whether such
payment was made at the residence of the debtor, or at that of
the creditor. In either case, the payment would contravene the
policy of the United States and the provisions of the Act of
Congress. We do not think, as argued by the counsel for the
defendants in error, that tTucker, Whitin &-Carere might and
ought to have supposed, when they saw McGill in Boston, that
he had abandoned his residence in the Confederate States, and
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so might lawfully have made payment to him. They would not
have been justified in coming to that conclusion, from the mere
fact of his presence in Boston, without permanent residence there
or elsewhere in the North, and without his having taken the oath,
of allegiance, which, by the established policy, would have been
exacted as a test of his loyalty. And accordingly we find that
they refused to pay, for a reason which plainly implied that the
defendants in error still resided in Virginia.
We may, therefore, lay out of view the applications for payment made by McGill, as not affecting the question before us.
. We have, then, the simple case of a debt due by citizens of
Massachusetts to citizens of Virginia, which became payable in
October 1861, and of a war in which the citizens of Virginia were
onemies to the citizens of Massachusetts, and in-which all commercial intercourse between them was not only unlawful on general
principles, but expressly prohibited by Act of Congress.
That the remedy for the recovery of a debt in such a case is
suspended during the existence of the war, and is revived upon
its termination, is a well-established principle of public law.
Whether, in a suit brought after the termination of the war, to
recover such a debt, interest can be recovered for the period of
the war, was a question much agitated in this country after the
close of the Revolutionary War, and gave rise to numerous judi.cial decisions. The question was discussed in the Court of Appeals
of Virginia in the case of Mc Call v. Turner, 1 Call 188, decided
in 1797. Though the question appears not to have bean directly
presented for adjudication in that case, yet the decision was
regarded as settling the question against the right to recover
interest, as will appear from the case of Brewer v. Hastie, 3 Call
22, decided by the same court in 1801, where the very point was
eCall v. Turner, the court
determined on the authority of
reversing a decree of Chancellor WYTHE, allowing the interest.
The same question has been decided the same way by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, in Hfoare v. Allen, 2 Dallas 102, and
Poxeraftv. Lagle, 2 Dallas 132 ; by the courts of Maryland and
South Carolina, in several cases colleed in 1 Am. Lead. Cas.
518;. by Mr. Justice WASHINGTON, of the Supreme Court of the
United States, in Corn et al. v. Penn et al., Peters's C. C. 496,
decided in 1818 ; and, within the last few weeks, by Judge Gms,
of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland,
VOL. XV.-15
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in a case reported in the newspapers. We are not aware of any
reported case which holds a contrary doctrine. The case of
Jones's Admrs. v. Hylton, 3 Dallas 199, which is cited by the
counsel for the defendants in error, as deciding that interest was
recoverable during the war, is no authority for that doctrine. It
appears from the report of that case that interest was allowed
from -the 7th day of July 1782, but it also appears that it was
not allowed prior to that time, though the bond was dated on the
7th day of July 1774. It thus appears that interest was not
allowed until eight years after the date of the bo'nd, which was
just the period of the war, but on what ground that was done
cannot be ascertained from the reported case.' There does not
appear, from the report, to have been any question as to interest
before the Supreme Court. We are confirmed inour opinion that
the question was not decided in that case by the declaration of
Mr. Justice WAsHnxGTON in Conn et al. v. Penn et al., that it
had never, as he believed, been decided by the Supreme Court.
After such a concurrence of judicial opinion and authority,
including at least one express decision of the Court of Appeals
of Yirginia, we do not feel disposed, if we felt at liberty, to
examine the question as an original one, and do not think it
,necessary to'explain the various grounds upon which the decisions
,referred to were -placed. We may remark, however, in conclu,sion, that the general principles quoted by the counsel for the
-defendants in error were fully recognised at the time the cases'
-above cited were decided. Thus, the remark of Judge PENDLETON
,quoted from the case of Jones v. Williams,'2 Call 102, that,
"interest is allowed because it is natural justice that he who has
the use of another's money should pay interest for it," was made
two years before the decision in Brewer v. Hastie, and the adage
zthat interest follows the principal as the shadow does the body,
was quoted by Lord HARDWIOKE, as a familiar saying, in the
Court of Chancery, as far back as 1749: Beckford v. Tobet, 1
Yes. Sr. 308.
Upon the whole, we are of opinion that interest during the war
is not recoverable, and that the judgment should be reversed.
The explanation doubtless is, that the jury refused to allow interest during the
war, though it appears that the Chief Justice, in his charge to the jury, expressed
his opinion in favor of the right to interest. See the opinion of PENDLxTON, J.,
-in McCall v. Turner, I Call 146.
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Court of Appeals of lYew York.
THE BELMONT BRANCH OF THE STATE BANK OF OHIO, Appel-'
lant, v. WILLIAM HOGE AND THOMAS S. HOGE, Respondents.
When commercial paper is pledged by The apparent owner before it matures, as
collateral security for advances, the pledgee in good faith is entitled to hold it for
the amount of such advances, though it turns out afterwards that the party making
the pledge was a mere agent for the true owner, and that the transaction was a
breach of duty to the principal.

The title of one who for full value receives a transfer of negotiable paper before
maturity, and without notice of any outstanding dr antecedent equities, is not
subject to be defeated by proof that he might have obtained such notice by the
exercise of active vigilance.
The fact that paper is transferred by a corporation, to secure advances at a rate
of interest exceeding seven per cent., does not tend to impeach the good faith of
the transferee, such a contract being no longer illegal.
Chapter 172 of the laws of 1850 operated pro tato as a repeal of the statutes
prohibiting usury, so far as they were applicable to stipulations for a rate of interest

exceeding seven per cent., where a corporation is the borrower.
APPEAL from the decision of the General Term of the Superior
Court of the city of New York, affirming a judgment in favor of
the defendants on the verdict of a jury.
The action was for the alleged conversion of four bills of exchange, amounting in the aggregate to about $14,000, and which
.were claimed to be the property of the plaintiff. The cause was
tried before Judge BoSworTH. A motion for a new trial was
denied at Special Term, and the order was affirmed at the General
Term. The case is reported in 7 Bosworth 543.
The following are the leading facts proved on the trial:The plaintiffs were a corporation, under the laws of Ohio.
They were correspondents of the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust
Company. The latter was also. a corporation, under the laws of
Ohio, and had an agency at New York, to whom they were in
the habit of sending the negotiable paper payable in New York
which had been taken by the plaintiffs in Ohio.
Between the 29th April 1857 and the 2ad June of the same
year, the plaintiffs enclosed by mail to the Ohio Life Insurance
and Trust Company, at New York, four acceptances of drafts
made in Ohio, payable in New York, four months after date,
respectively, for collection. The acceptances were the property
of the plaintiffs, received by themn in the course of their banking
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business, at Bridgeport, Ohio. The bills were all drawn by one
Samuel N. Pike, on persons in New York, payable four months
after date, respectively, to his own order, and were indorsed as
follows: 1 Samuel N. Pike, pay E. Ludlow, Esq., Cas., or order.
John C. Talman, Cas." They were indorsed in blank, in every
instance. John C. Talman was cashier of the plaintiff's bank at
Bridgeport, Ohio. Edwin Ludlow was cashier of the Ohio Life
Insurance and Trust Company, at New York. William Hoge &
Co., the defendants, were bankers in the city of New York.
The acceptances were all received by the defendants, for loans
and advances made by them, some thirty to ninety days before
maturity. The defendants had been in the habit of dealing with
the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company before Ludlow
was cashier, and continued dealing with them after he became
cashier.
The course of dealing between the Ohio Life Insurance and
Trust Company and the Ohio banks, their correspondents, was,
that the negotiable paper of the latter, payable in New York, was
sent to the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company for collection. When any of them wanted money in New York before the
transmitted paper fell due, the cashiers of the banks would write
to the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust. Company, at New York,
to have the paper put to their credit; the paper would then be
placed to the credit of the bank, deducting discount. The paper
thus credited had on it the- same indorsement after as before it
was so credited.
The course of dealing between the defendants and the Ohio
Life Insurance and Trust Company.was this: Ludlow, the cashier,
would apply to the defendants for a loan, on satisfactory securities: the character of the securities was then understood between
them. The cashier would then send a pass-book, with the securities, to the defendants; they would inspect the face of the paper
and indorsement, and then make the advance. As the paper on
which the advances were made approached maturity, the Ohio
Life Insurance and Trust Company would send the pass-book
with a view to have the notes, &c., returned. This.was done, on
the substitution of new securities or the payment of money by
that company.
The defendants supposed the acceptances to have belonged'to
the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company, and had no know-

BELMONT BRANCH BANK v. HOGE.

ledge of any other person having any interest therein. Ludlow,
the cashier of the Ohio Life and Trust Company, at or before the
taking of the paper by the defendants, had stated to them that
these banks wanted money, and were in the habit of leaning on,
the Ohio Life and Trust Company.
On the 24th August 1857 the Ohio Life and Trust Company
failed. After the failure, the plaintiffs, on the 28th August,
procured an order on the defendants to deliver up the securities
in question, which they presented to the defendants in New York,
who -refused to deliver them.
The Ohio Life and Trust Company were still in debt to the
defendants on these transactions, after giving them credit for all
they had received from securities.
The plaintiffs, during the trial, proposed to show that the Ohio
Life and Trust Company was a needy borrower, at high rates
of interest, exceeding the rate of seven per cent. per annum, and
that the advances in question were usurious. This was excluded
by the judge, on the defendants' objection. The plaintiffs excepted to the decision.
At the close of the evidence, the judge submitted to the jury
the question, whether the defendants received the paper in good
faith, and for value advanced, without notice of any defect of title,
or circumstance that should create suspicion: if so, he held that
the defendants were entitled to the verdict.
The charge of the judge, and the exceptions thereto, and to his
refusals to charge as requested, are stated in full in -the report
of the case in 7 Bosworth 543.
.EdwardsPierreyont, for the appellant.
Daniel Lord, for the respondents.
Po.TER, J.-Upon the facts proved, it is manifest that the jury
were right in finding that the defendants were bond fide hwlders
of the paper in question.
The instructions of the learned judge, on this branch of the
case, were more favorable to the plaintiffs than the law would
strictly justify. He gave them the benefit of the assumption
that, though the defendants took the paper from the apparent
owners for value, before it became due, and without notice of any
defect in their title, the plaintiffs could reclaim the bills, if they
eroved the existence of circumstances which would have been
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likely to excite the suspicions of a cautious and vigilant purchaser. We cannot accept this as an accurate exposition of the
rule applicable to the transfer of commercial paper, though it is
in accordance with antecedent decisions in the Superior Court:
Kentgen v. Parks, 2 Sandf. 60; Pringle v. Phillips,5 Id. 157;
Danforth v. Dart, 4 Duer 101.
We had occasion to express our views on this question, in the
case of Magee v. Badger, decided at the last December Term.
One who, for full value, obtains from the apparent owner a transfer
of negotiable paper before it matures, and who has no notice of
any equities between the original parties, or of any defect in the
title of the presumptive owner, is to be deemed a bond fide
holder. He does not owe to the party who puts such paper in
circulation, the duty of active inquiry, to avert the imputation of
bad faith. The rights of the holder are to be determined by the
simple test of honesty and good faith, and not by mere speculation
as to his probable diligence or negligence. The authority mainly
relied on, in the exceptional cases which have favored an opposite
theory, is the decision in Gill v. 6ubitt, reported in 3 Barn. &
Cress. 466. The doctrine of that case has been repeatedly overruled, as well in the English as in the American courts; and it
cannot be recognised as authority withbut sanctioning an unwise
innovation in our system of commercial law: Goodman v. HYarvey, 4 Adol. & Ell. 870; Bank of Bengal v. Fagan, 7 Moore
P. C. 61, 72; aphael v. Bank of England, 83 Eng. Law &
Eq. 276; 2 Parsons on Bills 272, 279; Worcester County Bank
v. DorchesterBank, 10 Cush. 488 ; Brush v. Scribner, 11 Conn.
388 ; Goodman v. Sinonds, 20 How. U. S. 843 ; Bank of Piitsburgh v. Neal, 22 Id. 96; Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall. U. S.
110, 118 ; Hall v. Wilson, 16 Barb. 550 ; Steinhart v. Boker,
84 Id. 436 ; Mc Williams v. Aason, 31 "N.Y. 294.
The judge was right in rejecting the offer of the plaintiff to
prove that the advances to the trust company, for which the paper
was pledged, were made on an agreement by the.latter to pay a
rate of interest exceeding seven per cent. The proposed proof
neither tended to show, that the defendants had notice that the
acceptances were not the property of the company, nor that the
transfer was made to secure the performance of a usurious and
illegal agreement. The Act of 1850 operated pro tanto as a
repeal of the statutes prohibiting usury, so far as they were appli-
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cable to stipulations for a rate of interest exceeding seven per
cent., where a corporation is the borrower. The contract which
the plaintiff proposed to prove, between the trust company and
the defendants, was one which the parties could lawfully make,
and which it would have been the duty of the courts to enforce:
Session Laws 1850, ch. 172, p. 334; Bosa v. Butterfleld, 33 N.
Y. 665; Butterworth v. O'Brien, 23 Id. 275; Southern Life
Insurance Co. v. Packer, 17 Id. 51; Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 Id.
85, 154, 229.
The other questions raised by the exceptions were properly
disposed of on the trial.
The judgment should be affirmed.
All the judges concurring,
Judgment affirmed.

Supreme Cfourt of Pennsylvania.
THE PHILADELPHIA AND ERIE RAILROAD COMPANY, AND
THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY, v. THE CATAWISSA RAILROAD COMPANY, AND THE WESTERN CENTRAL
RAILROAD COMPANY, OF PENNSYLVANIA, AND THE ATLANTIC AND GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY, OF THE
STATES OF OHIO, NEW YORK, AND PENNSYLVANIA.
Connecting railroads are either those which have such a union of tracks as will
admit the passage of cars from one to the other; or, those which have such an
intersection as will admit the convenient interchange of freight and passengers at
the point of intersection.
Therefore the Catawissa and the Atlantic and Great Western Railroads are connecting roads, though the difference in gauge prevents the transfer of cars from the
track of one to that of the other.
A private party, not authorized to represent the Commonwealth, has no right to
question the corporate existence, de jure, of a railroad company acting as a corporation under the laws of this state.

Two bills in equity, on appeal from Nisi Prius.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WOODWARD, 0. J.-Having decided in the 0uo warranto, sued
out by the Attorney-General against the Atlantic and Great
Western Railway Company, that the agreement and act of consolidation, bearing date the 19th August 1865, and entered into
by the several railroad companies therein named, was a valid and
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legal instrument' which, upon being filed with the Secretary of
State, in pursuance of the provisions of the Act of Assembly
of 24th March 1865, constituted the said Atlantic and Great
Western Railway Company a body corporate within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, it is neither necessary nor proper now,
at the suit of private parties, to enter again into the question of
the corporate existence, de jure, of the said railway company.
Having been called upon, by the proper representative of the
supreme power of the state, to show by what authority it claims
and exercises corporate franchises, and such title as it exhibited
having been sanctioned and approved by this court, not only all
private parties, but the state itself, is concluded thereby, and
henceforth it is to be taken and regarded as a railroad -company,
"created by, and existing under, the laws of this Commonwealth."
As such it was clearly empowered, by the Act of Assembly
of 28d April 1861, to lease the Catawissa Railroad, which it did,
by a contract of lease made on the 1st November 1865. This
*lease transferred the Catawissa Railroad and appurtenances to
the Atlantp and Great Western Railway for the term of nine
hundred and ninety-nine years, under and subject, nevertheless,
to several contracts theretofore entered into by the Catawissa
company with various parties, one of which-and the only one
material to the present suit-was with the Sunbury and Erie
Railroad Company, now known as the Philadelphia and Erie Railroad Company, dated the 81st October 1860. By virtue of this
contract, the Catawissa Company.acquired the right, for a period
of twenty years, to run its trains over that portion of the Philadelphia and Erie road that lies between Milton and Williamsport
-a distance of twenty-seven miles.
The plaintiffs' bill charged that, by transferring their road to
the Atlantic and Great Western Company, the Catawissa Company have put an end to this contract; and if it be not so, they
say the contract was not assignable to a rival corporation without
the consent of the Philadelphia and Erie Company.
There is nothing in the contract which, in terms, either authorizes or forbids the transfer, It was a legal and valid contract,
fully authorized by the Acts of Assembly of 18th March 1847,
section 1, and the Act of 29th March 1859, section 1 (Purd.
844) ; and the right, which it conferred upon the Catawissa Coinpany, to run, under special regulations, twenty-seven miles of the
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Philadelphia and Erie Company's road, from Milton to Williamsport, constituted, to say the least of it, an aplurteicace. of the
Catawissa Railroad. As an appurtenance, it would pass to the
Atlantic and Great Western Company, under the lease of 1st
November 1865, unless restrained by the necessary construction
of the original instrument conferring the right. On this point
it is argued that the fourteenth clause or section of the agreement
ought to be construed to restrain the transfer. That clause
.declares that in case of an assignment, "for the benefit of creditors," by the Catawissa Company, or in case of a "judicial saleor
transfer" of their road, the agreement shall be void, and of no
effect. But the transfer here was neither an assignment for the
benefit of creditors, within the meaning of the fourteenth clause,
nor a judicial sale or transfer, but a voluntary transfer of a lawful appurtenance along with the main body of the Catawissa
Railroad; and such a transfer, forbidden by nothing in the agreement, was authorized by the Act of Assembly of 23d April 1861,
which gave railroad companies'power to contract for the lease or
use of railroads of other companies. As matter of construction,
it must be held that this power to lease applies as well to the
appurtenancesof a railroad, as to the very structure of the road
itself. By virtue of the prior acts above referred to, tht Catawissa Company acquired this appurtenance, and annexed it to
their road. By virtue of the Act of April 1861, they could
transfer it as part of their road, acquired and transferred on the
faith of legislation. Why should the transfer be thought to put
an end to the contract ? Where -was the ground of forfeiture ?
De it, that the contract was not assignable at law, or that the
companies had not power, under their respective charters, to
make or transfer such contracts, these enabling statutes came to
their assistance, and supplied what was lacking.
We have said that these statutes authorized the lease and
transfer of the incidents and appurtenancesof railroads, as well
as the body of the roads. We take this to be the necessary
meaning of the legislation, else necessary and convenient appendages would be dissevered in every instance of a lease, to the
detriment of all parties in interest. The legislature could not
have intended, to produce such results, but they meant, rather,
that companies should be enabled to contract for the leasing
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and using of their respective roads in the same entire and perfect condition in which they held and enjoyed them.
We find, therefore,-not in the agreement by which the Catawisa Company held this appurtenance, nor in their charter, but
in these enabling stattes,-the requisite authority and power to
transfer to the Atlantic and Great Western Company the same
rights on the Philadelphia and Erie Railroad, between Milton and
Williamsport, which the Catawissa Company acquired and held
by virtue of the agreement of 31st October 1860; and we see no
provision of the agreement that is violated by such transfer, and
consequently there is no forfeiture.
As to the consent of the Philadelphia and Erie Company to
the transfer, there is nothing in the contract that stipulates for it,
and hence wve cannot think it-necessary. If it -as apprehended
that the contract might pass into the hands of a rival company,
the power of transfer should have been restrained by suitable
stipulations. If the legislative authority to transfer did not exist
-under the Acts of 1847 and 1859, the facility with which such
authority could be obtained was well known, and should have
been guarded against in framing the agreement, but was not. To
annex so valuable an appurtenance to the Catawissa road, and
make itr, for twenty years, virtually a part of that road, without
restraint or qualification, was to subject it to the chances of a
lease and to the provisions of all existing and subsequent legislation. It is too late now to complain that it has passed into the
hands of a rival.
But the great objection to the lease of 1st November 1865 is,
that the Catawissa Railroad and the railway of the Atlantic and
Great Western Company are not connecting roads, either directly
or by means.of intervening railroads. The Act of Assembly of
28d April 1861, already referred to, after conferring power upon
railroad companies to contract for the use and lease of each others'
roads, concludes with a proviso, 1"tthat te roads of the companies,
so contracting or leasing, shall be directlyj, or byi means of intervening railroads,connected with each other."
That the Catawissa and the Atlantic and Great Western are
not directly connecting roads must be admitted; for their nearest
termini are several hundred miles asunder; and it is argued that
*aconnection by the Philadelphia and Erie, as an intervening railroad, is impossible, because of the diversity of gauge in the tracks
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of these roads: that of the Philadelphia and Erie being four feet
eight and a half inches, and that of the Atlantic and Great West.
ern, six feet. Although these roads cross at grade near Corry,
and come to common platforms and depots at that place, so that
the passengers and freight are transhipped from one road to the'
other, yet it is said they are not connecting roads; and it is
earnestly argued that no roads of different gauge can connect
with each other, within the meaning of the proviso of the Act
of Assembly.
If, in construing, the proviso, we were to govern ourselves by
the strict laws of language, the argument would be likely to
prevail; because it is indubitable, that the word connect, etymologically considered, implies a closer union than can be made
of railroad tracks of different gauges. The Latin particle con,
when used as a prefix, signifies union or association; as concourse-a running together; and when placed before the verb
neeto, which means to tie, we have the root of our English word
connect, which, taken literally, must mean to tie togethek, to be
joined, or united. Perhaps the most perfect illustration of the
meaning of this word is derived from the process of knitting,
where the union of parts becomes very intimate. It would be
difficult to say that railroads of different gauges could be knitted
together; so intimate a union between such roads is physically
*impossible.
But it is legislative language we are to construe, and it must
be received, not necessarily according to its etymological meaning, but according to its popular acceptation, and especially in
the sense in which the legislature is accustomed to use the same
words. The legislature did not limit the right of connection to
roads of similar gauge. Nor yet were they ignorant that diverse
gauges prevailed in Pennsylvania; and that, under the Act of
11th February 1853, every railroad company may adopt a gauge
of their road, and change it according to the discretion of directors. And it must be presumed that the legislature of 1861 knew
also-what the industry of counsel has fully shown to us-that a
great number of Acts of Assembly, running through a period of
nearly twenty years, had provided for the connection of railroads
with canals, plank-roads, and other public improvements; for
connection between canals and cities, and for the connection of
railroads of different gauges. We have also been referred to
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numerous Acts of Assembly, in which the legislative intent, that
railroads should be so connected as that cars might run from one
road upon the other, has been fully expressed, making thus a distinction in the legislative mind, between mere connecting, and so
compylete a connection as to allow the use of the same cars on
both roads. I do not cite these various acts, because they arce
sufficiently referred to in the printed'briefs ; but it is impossible
to go through them without seeing that the legislature have customarily used the words "connect" and "connection" in railroad
laws, in a much more loose and general sense, than their radical
signification; and that, where a union has been intended so intimate as to enable cars to .pass from one road to another, this
intention has been expressed in unmistakeable language. We
would therefore violate all legislative analogies, and disregard
ofir whole railroad history, were we to construe the proviso to the
and deny
Act of 1861 according to the strict laws of.
connection to railroads of dissimilar ga1lges. But, on the other
hand, W¢e conform ourselves to the course of Pennsylvania legislation, when we define a railroad connection to mean, where no
supplementary terms are used,'either such a union of tracks as to
admit the passage of cars from one road to the other, or such
intersection of roads as to admit the convenient interchange of
freight and passengers at the point of intersection.
We have, in Penm ylvania, many instances of both these kinds
of connection; everyman is familiar with both, and both come
up to -the legislative idea of connection, except in those cases
where more is expressed than is found in the Act of 1861.
We have the testimony of numerous witnesses, engineers, railroad presidents, superintendents, and others, upon the point, and
very considerable conflict of opinion among them; .but it is not a
question of art, to be decided by expertg, or by men particularly
skilled in railroad business, but is rather a question of statutory
construction, and the words of a statuite-if of common use-are
to be taken in their natural, plain, obvious, and ordinary signification. The legislative intent is to be sought for through this
ordinary signification of common words; and if a contemporaneous
construction of the same words by the legislature itself can be
discovered, it, is very high evidence of the sense in which the
words are to be received; for contemvoranea expositio estfordssima in lege.
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Therefore it is we lay out of view the conflicting opinions of
the highly respectable witnesses who were examined on one side
or the other-though a decided majority of them are against
identity of gauge as essential to railroad connections-and place
ourselves upon the legislative interpretation of the legislative
terms in question. Standing on this ground, we decide that the
Catawissa and the Atlantic and Great Western are railroads
connected by an intervening road, notwithstanding the diversity
of gauge prevents the running of common cars. The intersection at Corry, that has been formed between the Philadelphia
and Erie and the Atlantic and Great Western, being such as
admits the interchange of freight and passengers, constitutes
a connection between the Catawissa and Atlantic. and Great
Western, within the meaning of the proviso of the statute under
consideration.
As an opinion expressed by me, at Nisi Prins, in the case of
The Lehigh TYalley RaiZrood Co. v. The Lehigh Coal and Navigation Co., was referred to by my learned brother READ, in
ruling this case below, it may be proper to observe that the
characterof the connection to be formed was not the question
there, and had not been discussed. The two roads were of the
same gauge; and the point ruled was, that a connection between
them must be formed somewhere in Luzerne county; and I
defined that necessary connection to be such a union of the two
roads as to admit the transition of cars. It was no general exposition of railroad. connections, but only a definition of that
particular connection. If anything more than this can be made
out of that opinion, I am bound to say that the subsequent argument of this case, and the consultations and reflections upon it,
have settled me in the construction hereinbefore expressed.
And now, whilst a multitude of subjects, that were pressed into
the argument of the present case, have been pretermitted, we
have passed upon all the questions raised by the assignment of
errors, and have thus sufficiently explained and justified the
grounds of the decree, which we entered at our adjourned term
at Wilkesbarre, in June last, that the decree at .Nisi Prius be
reversed and set aside, and that the complainant's bill be dismissed with costs.
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Circuit Court of the Un~ited States. .Districtof Wimcngin.
CYRUS WOODMAN v. THE KILBOURN MANUFACTURING COMPANY ET AL
The Ordinance of Congress of August 1787, under the Articles of Confederation,

for the government of the territory north-west of the Ohio river, is superseded by
the Constitution of the United States.
The United States, under the power to regulate commerce among the several
states, have paramount authority over a navigable stream bearing a necessary relation to such commerce.'

In the absence of the exercise of'such authority on the part of the United States,
the state governments may regulate the navigation of such streams.
Tho people have a right to the use of a navigable stream; but the legislature,
with the object of public improvement and convenience, may appropriate the use

of the surplus water to a local purpose.
APPLICATION for an injunction upon bill and affidavits.
Opinion delivered at January Term 1867, by
MILLER, District Judge.-It is alleged and charged in the bill,
that the Wisconsin is one of the navigable rivers leading into the
Mississippi River, and a common highway, free to be navigated
and used as such highway by complainant and all other citizens
of the United States. That said river *is navigable from its
source to its mouth, and capable of being used for-rafting and for
driving lumber; and also for steamboat navigation; and that it
runs through a district of pine lands lying above the town of
Newport. That the owners of said lands, including complainant,
annually raft down said river large quantities of lumber and logs
to saw-mills and to market; and. that they are dependent upon
the unobstructed use of the river in this employment. The bill
'further bharges, that in 1859 a dam was constructed in said river
at the town of Newport, by a chartered company, for hydraulic
purposes, which, being an obstruction to navigation, was partly
removed. And that the company defendant are building a dam
at the same place, using a portion of the old dam ; and that this
company are doing so under color or in pursuance of an act of the
state legislature, entitled "An Act to aid in the developmeilt of
manufacturing interests in this state," approved April 10th 1866,
as follows: '- The Kilbourn Manufacturing Company, whenever
organized in pursuance of any law of this state, shall have power,
and said company is hereby authorized to complete the water-
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power in sections three, four, nine, and ten in township thirteen,
north of range six, east in the counties of Columbia and Sauk, by
raising the dam sufficient height for that purpose, not exceeding
three feet above the usual low-water mark in the Wisconsin river,
and so forming the same that rafts of lumber can pass safely and'
conveniently without hindrance or delay." The bill then charges
that it is physically impossible to build a dam at that point, the
town of Newport, in such form as that rafts of lumber can pass
safely or conveniently,, or-without hindrance or delay; and that
such dam .would wholly obstruct the navigation of the river by
steamboats and other vessels; and will entirely obstruct navigation up stream; and that the structure, as at present towards
completion, has obstructed free passage to rafts and .caused to the
owners thereof delay and damage. It is furthe r charged, that
the act authorizing the construction of tfe dam is contrary to the
Ordinance of 1787, the constitution and laws of the United States,
and of this state.
Defendants Anderson and Kilbourn are alleged to be agents
of the company defendant in the work of building the dam.
The bill prays an injunction restraining defendants from further proceeding in the building of the dam; and that at the final
hearing the dam may be decreed to be abated as a common
nuisance.
Affidavits read on the part of complainant sustain the charges
in the bill in regard to the obstruction of navigation by the proposed dam. Those on part of defendants state that the dam will
be an improvement to navigation at that point. It does not
satisfactorily appear that the river above the site of the dam is
navigable for steamboats employed in the ordinary business of
commerce. It is conceded that rafts of logs and lumber can be
floated down stream from several miles above the dam.
The ordinance of the Confederate Congress, for the government
of the territory of the United States north-west of the river Ohio,
adopted July 14th 1787, created a temporary government; and
also contained six articles, " to be considered as al ticles of compact between the original states and bhe people and states in said
territory, and for ever remain unalterable, unless by common conBent." After the adoption of the Constitution Pf the United
States, an Act of Congress, passed August 7th 17,R9 (1 Stat. at
Large 50), continued the ordinance hL force, aid uiodified it in
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conformity to the conditions of the constitution, so far as it
related to the temporary government of the territory.
That portion of the ordinance referred to in the bill is, "the
navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence
and the carrying-places between the same, shall be common highways, and for ever free as well to the inhabitants of said territory
as to the citizens of the United States, and those of any other
states that may be admitted into the confederacy, without any
tax, impost, or duty therefor." The Constitution of the United
States, subsequently adopted, contains the provision that "new
states may be admitted by the Congress into this Union," which
implies that new states shall be admitted into the Union on an
equality with the original states. The ordinance directs that the
territory may be divided into not less than three nor more than
five states; but the territory has been divided into six states,
including that portion of Minnesota east of the Mississippi river.
The ordinance further directs, that in case of. a division into five
states, one boundary shall be an east and west line diawn through
the southerly bend or extreme of Lake Michigan; which we know
to have been entirely disregarded by Congress in the acts admitting new states. If the ordinance were obligatory in every
particular, and not altered by common consent, nor superseded
by the Constitution of the United States, the states embraced
within the north-western territory could not have been admitted
into the Union on an equality with the other states, which isa
fundamental principle of the constitution, the basis of thiB
Union. Each new state presented its constitution to the consideration of Congress, with its application for admission into the
Union under the Federal Constitution; Congress, composed of
members from the original states, approved the constitution of the
new state thus presented, and passed an act for its admission into
the Union. By the Act of Congress admitting the new state
upon its application, the several articles of the compact were not
merely altered by the common consent required in the ordinance,
but were superseded. " Whatever may have been the force
accorded to the ordinance at the period of its enactment, its
authority and effect ceased, and yielded to the paramount authority of the Constitution of the United States from the time of its
adoption :" Pollard'sLessee v. Hfagan, 8 How. 212; Parmelee
v. The First Municivalty of New Orleans, Id. 589; Strader
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v. Graham, 10 Id. 82; JDred Scott v. Sandford, 19 Id.
393-490-91-92. It therefore follows that the act of the legislature authorizing the construction of the dam in question is not
prohibited by the ordinance.
The General Government, under the constitutional power of
Congress "to regulate commerce among the several states," has
done no act prohibiting or interfering with this state in regulating
the navigation of the Wisconsin river. No Act of Congress has
been passed upon the subject of commerce on that river, which
includes navigation. Nor have boats or vessels been licensed,
nor ports of entry established on said river by Federal authority.
The Wisconsin river being a domestic stream, rising, running,
and emptying into the Mississippi river, within the state, local
legislation is unrestricted by Federal authority; unless it is in
conflict with the navigation laws; or some other enactments of
Congress. In the absence of action on the part of the United
States in regard to the navigation of the river, as a stream
bearing a necessary relation to commerce among the several
states, the power of the legislature under the state constitution,
to pass the act authorizing the construction of the dam in question, is the next subject for consideration.
The Wisconsin river is a meandered stream according to the
government survey of public lands. Although it is not navigable
-in its unimproved condition above the site of the dam for steamboats navigating the Mississippi river, yet it is navigable in the
common sense of the term. The soil or bed of the river is not
granted to riparian purchasers usque ad filum, but the body of
the stream is reserved to the public. The river is therefore open
and free to all persons, for purposes of navigation; not as a personal right, but subject to governmental authority. The right to
unobstructed. navigation of the-river is to be regarded as a clear
and undoubted right, paramount to every other use of the water.
It is an inherent paramount right of the people, but not exclusive
of a partial obstruction or inconsiderable detention, by a dam constructed in pursuance of governmental authority for the development of the country, for the accommodation of public necessities,
or of commerce, or travel upon land. Partial diminution of the
navigability of a stream for these purposes, unless restrained by
the superior legislation or authority of the General Government,
has been within the established power of the states since the forma,
VOL. XV.-16
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tion of the gover'nment. In the case of Wilson v. The Blackbird
Creek Marsh Co., 2 Peters 245, it appears that the creek Was a
navigable stream flowing into the Delaware river; and that the
legislature of the state of Delaware passed an act empowering
the company to build a dam in said creek, for the purpose of
excluding the water from the surrounding marsh, and thereby
enhance the value of property on its banks, and probably improve
the health of the inhabitants. The dam was a total obstruction
of navigation. The court decided that the measure authorized
by the act stops a, navigable stream and must be supposed to
abridge the rights of those accustomed to use it. But this
abridgment, unless it comes in conflict with the constitution, or a
law of the United States, is an affair between the government of
the state of Delaware and its citizens. In Martin v. Waddle,
16 Peters 410, the court say: ' When the revolution took place,
the people of each state became themselvea sovereign, and in.that
character held the absolute right to all their navigable waters and
the soil under them for their own common use, subject only io the
rights surrendered by the constitution of the General Government." The admission of the new states into the Union on an
equality with the original states gives them the same absolute
rights, notwithstanding the title to the soil was originally'in the
United Sta;tes: Pollard v. Hfagan, 8 How. 212. See, also,
G-ibbon v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; Pennsylvania v. The Wheeling
Bridge Co., 13 How. 519 and 18 Id. 421, 480, 482; Gilman v.
Philadelphia,8 Wallace 718, and the opinion of Justice GRUMR
in The Passaic Bridge Case, Id. 782. It cannot be claimed
that complainant, a citizen of the state of Massachusetts, has
right to the navigation or use of the Wisconsin river, superior to
-that of the inhabitants of the state. By the Federal Constitution
" the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several states."
It is claimed, on the part of complaifnant, that the act authorizing the construction of the dam in question is repugnant to the
provision in article nine of the state constitution, that "the navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and the St. Laivrenbe,
and the carrying places between the same, shall be common highways, and for ever free, as well to the inhabitants of the state as
to- the citizens of the United States, without any tax, impost,*or
auty therefor." This article is incorporated in the constitution
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from the Ordinance of 1787. The navigable waters, such as the
Wisconsin river, running into the Mississippi river, shall be common highways; and their navigation, to the extent of their navigable capacity, cannot be materially obstructed. Such rivers,
may be considered navigable waters without any siich constitutional provision, as Congress has the power to regulate commerce
between the states, which includes the navigation of navigable
streams. The paramount right of navigation being in the people,
who may wish to use a navigable stream, any obstruction, however
inconsiderable, without constitutional legislative authority, is a
nuisance, to be abated at the suit of an individual, or of the state.
This principle is prescribed in a general law of the state, "that
all rivers and streams of water in this state, -in all places where
the same have been meandered and returned as navigable hy the
surveyors employed by the United States government, be declared
navigable to such an extent that no dam, bridge, or other obstruction may be made in or over the same without the permission of
the legislature?' This law establishes, by statute, the inherent
common-law right of the legislature to investigate and ascertain
the extent of the navigability of streams and of the kind of proposed partial obstructions to" navigation, for the general convenience and use of the people. In the case of the Blackbird creek,
in the state of Delaware, navigation was totally obstructed by the
.dam built in pursuance of a legislative act; but whether such an
obstruction could be built in one of the navigable streams of
Wisconsin, this case does not require a decision. It is'very clear
that neither in Delaware nor in Wisconsin can even a partial
obstruction be made without governmental authority. The legislature has the power to inquire into the necessity for a structure,
such as a bridge or dam over or in a navigalle stream, and to
prescribe the conditions and plns upon which the proposed improvement may be made. It is also the province of the legislature
to inquire into the navigability of a stream and the uses to which
surplus water may be applied. The navigability of the stream
is the subject of proof. The return of the surveyors, showing a
stream ta have been meandered, is not conclusive: Jones v. Pettibone, 2 Wis. Rep. 808. That case announced the principle, that
the effect of the statute is not to declare that meandered streams
are navigable in fact, so as to dispense- with proof of their navigability, when the fact 3s to be established, but only that they
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shall be regardea as navigable to such an extent that no obstruction shall be placed in them without the consent of the legislature.
The statute declares that the legislature possesses the exclusive
power to direct and control the municipal policy of the state in
regard to improvements and partial obstructions of navigable
streams. The constitutional provision is a declaration of a principle inherent in a sovereign state of the Union, and the statute
is notice of such power.
It is not for an individual, but for the state, to decide whether
the whole of a public highway is necessary for the public accommodation or not; hence any partial obstruction of any navigable
stream or highway, or of any portion of it, without legislative
authority, is a nuisance. The public have a right to the use of
the entire highway; and no citizen can appr6priate a portion,
upon the. principle that enough remains for public use. The
legislature is to judge of that. The act authorizing the construction of the dam in question is in the nature of a public grant
of the use of surplus water of the river for the improvement aid
development.of the country, and for the accommodation of the
people in the. vicinity. In making this grant, the legislature
probably were influenced by the consideration that the man who
builds a mill or manufactory in a new c6untry is a public benefactor. See The People v. The City of St. Louis, 5 Gilman
351; Hart v. Thie .Mayor of Albany. 9 Wend. 571; Bay Eahrbor
v. TIe ty of Monroe,'Wilkins's Oh. Rep. 155 ; Flaniganv. The
City of Philadelphia,6 Wright. 219. Several acts have been
passed by-the state legislature, from time to time, authorizing the
construction of dams in meandered. rivers, upon such plans, or in
such forms, that rafts of lumber can pass safely and conveniently
'without hindrance or delay. Such acts were also passed by the
territorial legislature while the ordinance was considered in force
in the territory. I have come to the, conclusion that the act
authorizing the construction of the dam in question is within the
constitutional power of the legislature.
The bill complains of a prospective abridgment of complainant's
right to the free navigation of the river. He has not been injured
by the dam at present in process of construction. Defendants
must be allowed a reasonable time to construct the dam, not
exceeding three feet in height above low-water mark, and in sich
form as rafts of lumber can pass safely and conveniently without
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hindrance or delay, according to the act. The work cannot be
restrained by injunction, upon the theory that no dam can be constructed at that point that will not obstruct the navigable use of
the river. The legislature have autho-;7ed defendants to make,
the experiment if a dam can be constrioted as required by the
act, and the court will permit the Iractical test to be applied.
If the speculations of complainant's bill should be realized, and
defendants' efforts prove unsuccessful, the dam will have to be
abated at their costs. Mdere theoretical opinions are not sufficient
in law for enjoining the progress of a work in the nature of a
public improvement authorized by a legislative act.
If the dam shall be constructed according to the requirements
of the act, the paramount right of those navigating the river
with rafts of lumber is satisfied. They cannot complain if the
dam should detain their rafts a few minutes, or should require
caution in passing through or over it. The only question on final
hearing will be whether the dam not exceeding three feet above
low-water mark is so constructed that, with proper care and caution, " rafts of lumber can pass safely and conveniently without
hindrance or delay." Since the year 1838 a dam with a lock
for ascending and descending trade has stood in the Fox river at
Depere, in this state. The time required for passing the lock is
no hindrance or delay. In the year 1840 a bill was brought
before me, as territorial judge, to restrain the erection of a
bridge over the Milwaukee river at Milwaukee, which is at that
place an arm of the lake, navigable for all classes of 'boats and
vessels. Being satisfied that the bridge was to be built with a
draw, which could be opened and closed in fifteen or twenty
minutes, I considered that the interests of commerce must submit to an inconsiderable delay or inconvenience for the accommodation and necessity of the people, and dismissed the bill.
Since that day bridges with draws have been constructed, in pursuance of legislative acts, over almost every river in the land.
Dams, too, are built by the same authority in navigable streams,
with locks or sluices, for the accommodation of the whole people.
The injunction prayed for is refused.

